

POLICY AND POWER

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE 'OLD' AND 'NEW' PARADIGM

Bas Arts and Jan van Tatenhove

Dr. Bas Arts, senior lecturer
Department of Environmental Policy Sciences
University of Nijmegen
P.O. Box 9108
6500 HK Nijmegen
The Netherlands
tel. +31 24 3612103; fax. +31 24 3611841
e-mail: b.arts@bw.kun.nl

Dr. Jan van Tatenhove, associate professor
Department of Environmental Policy Sciences
University of Nijmegen, and
Department of Political Science
University of Amsterdam
Oudezijds Achterburgwal 237
1012 DL Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Tel. + 31 20 5253604; fax. + 31 20 5252086
e-mail: vantatenhove@pscw.uva.nl and
j.vantatenhove@bw.kun.nl

Policy and Power

A Conceptual Framework Between the 'Old' and 'New' Paradigm

Summary

During the last few decades, both policy practices and policy vocabularies have drastically changed. Concepts such as interactive planning, network management, stakeholder dialogue, deliberative democracy, policy discourses, governance, etc. have replaced older ones such as public administration, policy programmes, interest groups, institutions, power, and the like. Although we recognise the relevance and importance of this paradigmatic shift, we also regret related 'losses'. We particularly regret that the concept of power has - in our view - become an 'endangered species' in the field of policy analysis. We therefore will develop a framework to analyse power - being a multi-layered concept in our eyes - in policy practices in this article. We will do so on the basis of the so-called policy arrangement approach, which we have developed with colleagues elsewhere. In addition, we draw upon Giddens' structuration theory and Clegg's circuits of power in developing our argument and model. As a result, we hope to combine the best of two worlds, of the 'old' and the 'new' paradigms in policy sciences, and to achieve our two aims: to bring back in the concept of power in current policy analysis and to expand the concept from a policy perspective.

Introduction

Recently the organisation and substance of policy making have substantially changed in several western countries. This change concerns shifting power relations between the sub-national, national and trans-national levels of policy making, and a redefinition of politics between public and private actors. Whereas the national state was the predominant actor in politics in the 1970s, the influence of market and civil society stakeholders have been strengthened since then. In this paper these developments are analysed in terms of *power* and *policy*, and empirical examples are mainly taken from the environmental field. This analysis builds on the book *Political Modernisation and the Environment. The Renewal of Environmental Policy Arrangements*, which we recently published (Kluwer Academic Publ.: Dordrecht, Boston, 2000). In this book, we developed the concepts of *policy arrangements*, *political modernisation* and *policy innovation* to enable us to understand the institutionalisation and change of environmental policy making as the duality of interaction (agency) and social and political change (structure).

In section 2 we reflect upon the notion of policy arrangement, which is the temporary stabilisation of the organisation and substance of a policy domain. The duality of structure is further elaborated upon as the process of political modernisation on the one hand and policy innovation on the other, leading to the institutionalisation of new policy arrangements (section 3). Political modernisation refers to changing

relationships between state, market and civil society, as well as to new conceptions of governance (subsection 3.1). Policy innovation, next, refers to the renewal of policy making as a result of day-to-day interactions between agents (subsection 3.2). Due to these processes of political modernisation and policy innovation, there is a shift from traditional policy arrangements (statist, corporatist, and liberal) to a combination of traditional and innovative ones in current policy domains (subsection 3.3). Innovative arrangements refer, amongst others, to policy coalitions that exceed the nation state model and to shifting balances of power. These three concepts - policy arrangement, political modernisation, policy innovation - are the core ones of our theoretical approach (Van Tatenhove, 1999; Arts and Van Tatenhove, 2000; Van Tatenhove et al., 2000).

However, the concept of power was - although considered one of the core dimensions of a policy arrangement - only poorly dealt with in our approach. Therefore in section 4 we further elaborate on this dimension. In doing so, we will develop a three-layered model of power (compare: Lukes, 1974; Clegg, 1989). *Dispositional* power will be linked to 'policy arrangements', *structural* power to 'political modernisation' and *relational* power to 'policy innovation'. In section 5, subsequently, we look back to the change of policy arrangements from a power perspective. Finally, we will draw some conclusions (section 6).

Policy Arrangements

A policy arrangement refers to the temporary stabilisation of the organisation and substance of a policy domain, at a specific level of policy making (Van Tatenhove et al., 2000: 54). The concept allows for analysing substance *and* organisation as well as change *and* stability in policy making. As far as the first dyad is concerned, one should acknowledge the fact that there is no such thing as a policy without *substance* (principles, objectives, measures etc.), and, equally, that there is no such thing as a policy without *organisation* (departments, instruments, procedures, division of tasks and competence etc.). In addition, a time-space notion is part of the definition. On the one hand, any stabilisation of a policy domain is only temporary, as arrangements are under pressure of constant change, either by policy innovations on the ground or by processes of political modernisation (see section 3). On the other hand, policy arrangements may evolve at different levels of policy making: local, national and international.

In order to diagnose stability and change in policy arrangements, we need to elaborate on its main aspects: organisation and substance. As far as *organisation* is concerned, we join Giddens' structuration theory and conceptualise organisations as social systems, being sets of agents that are nested in structures of rules and resources (Giddens, 1984). In this, three main dimensions of organisation can be distinguished: agents (coalitions), rules and resources. The second aspect of the policy arrangement concept, *substance*, is operationalised in terms of 'policy discourse' (compare: Dryzek, 1997; Hajer, 1997).




Figure 1: Operationalisation scheme of the concept of 'policy arrangement'

This figure shows the interrelation between the four dimensions and implies that the institutionalisation of a policy arrangement should be studied as one interrelated complex, in which distinctions have to be made for analytical reasons. On the basis of these four dimensions, arrangements can be typified (see also section 3).

In general, a policy arrangement can be characterised by a number of **policy coalitions**. Each coalition consists of a number of players who share resources and/or interpretations of a policy discourse, in the context of the rules of the game (see below). As a consequence these coalitions identify (more or less) similar policy goals, and engage in policy processes to achieve those goals. In doing so, some coalitions may support the dominant policy discourse or rules of the game, while others might challenge these (*supporting* versus *challenging* coalitions). The formation and development of policy coalitions can be studied from a strategic and from an institutional point of view. Studying policy coalitions from the perspective of the actors' strategic conduct is comparable with the policy network approach. This analysis focuses on the kind of social relations between interdependent actors which, primarily for strategic reasons, shape around policy problems and policy programmes in specific policy domains (cf. Kickert et al., 1997). Sharing a policy coalition is considered to be a strategic choice by actors, aiming to achieve their goals, and therefore looking for partners with whom policy interpretations are shared and an acceptable consensus can be reached. The analysis of the formation and development of policy coalitions from an institutional perspective has its starting point in the process of political modernisation (see section 3). Each phase of political

modernisation results in different coalitions between representatives of the state, the market and the civil society at the national or at international level. In general, the process of political modernisation shows a broadening of coalitions and the emergence of new coalitions which cross the traditional divides and boundaries of the nation state model. An example of new and unexpected coalitions is the co-operation of some business and environmental organisations, such as the insurance industry and Greenpeace, to achieve substantial reduction targets for greenhouse gases, attempting to reach their goals not only through intergovernmental politics but also through ‘self-regulation’ of market agents.

The **allocation and division of resources** is the second dimension of policy arrangements, as these are ‘systems of power’. However, power has to be regarded, on the one hand, as the ability of actors to mobilise resources in order to achieve certain outcomes in networks and, on the other, as a dispositional and a structural phenomenon of social and political systems (see also section 4). The former refers to political power as a more or less permanent capacity of agents-in-interaction to maintain and transform their social or physical environment, and more specifically to achieve certain policy outcomes (Giddens, 1984; Guzzini, 1993; Held, 1995). Such outcomes may be achieved not only by determining political decisions, but also by dominating public debates, defining policy issues, setting agendas, or even changing the rules of the game (see next section), either at national or at international level (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Krasner, 1985; Strange, 1988).

However, to conceptualise power as mere capacity tends to ignore all those cases in which power is ‘covertly’, ‘unnoticed’ or ‘unconsciously’ exercised (Lukes, 1974). This means that the ability to achieve political outcomes also depends upon relations of autonomy and dependency between actors ‘in which these actors draw upon and reproduce structural properties of domination’ (Giddens, 1981: 28-29). While it may be true that in the constitution of power agents are able to mobilise authoritative and allocative resources, it is also obvious that these resources are unequally divided among actors in any social system. In other words, power is about the asymmetrical distribution of resources (structural phenomenon), revealing itself in relations of autonomy and dependency between actors (dispositional phenomenon). The more these relations of power are objectified in institutional mechanisms and organisational routines – fixing, so to speak, the allocation of competencies, qualifications, revenues and positions – the more natural and obvious domination seems (Frouws, 1993: 19).

The third dimension of a policy arrangement, the **rules of the game** delineate a policy domain, i.e. they define the possibilities and constraints for policy agents to act within that domain. As such, these rules determine how politics is played, which norms are legitimate, and how policy outcomes are achieved, e.g. by which procedures, by which allocation of tasks, and by which division of competencies between actors and organisations. One can easily distinguish between formal and informal rules, the former being fixed and authorised in legal texts or documents, the

latter being part of the predominant – but changing – political culture. A similar analytical distinction has to be made between rules of signification and legitimisation on the one hand, and rules used by actors in the policy making process itself on the other. In politics in general and in (re)producing and transforming policy arrangements in particular, actors constantly draw upon rules that provide them with guidelines to act properly and legitimately. In fact, these rules generate the definition of meaningful and justified circumstances. They define those agents who are the ‘right’ political players to be involved, and those who are not. In addition, they define the interrelations between actors, and, as a consequence, they delineate the boundaries of policy coalitions: who is in and who is out; how one can get in; what the relationship with outsiders is; etc. Moreover, these rules describe how the political game should be played: how issues may be raised; agendas set; interests articulated; policies formulated; decisions made; and measures implemented. In short, the rules of the game encompass all modes of production and interpretation of meaningful and legitimate conduct in (environmental) policy arrangements, implying the self-conscious application of normative and interpretative schemes (discourses) by the actors involved, which are included in sanctioning procedures (see Giddens, 1984; Cohen; 1989).

The fourth dimension of a policy arrangement – referring to *substance* – is ‘**policy discourse**’. To understand and give meaning to environmental problems and to design possible solution strategies, actors draw upon interpretative schemes or environmental policy discourses. A policy discourse can be defined as: ‘A specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorisations that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities’ (Hajer, 1997: 44). On the basis of this definition and in accordance with structuration theory, we define policy discourses as dominant interpretative schemes, ranging from formal policy concepts to popular story lines, by which meaning is given to a policy domain. In general, a policy arrangement can be characterised by one dominant policy discourse, the content of which is continuously challenged by (elements of) competing discourses. Examples of policy discourses in the environmental field are ‘small is beautiful’, ‘eco-development’, ‘political ecology’, ‘ecological modernisation’ and ‘sustainable development’ (respectively Schumacher, 1974; Sachs, 1977; Benton, 1997; Huber, 1985; Mol, 1995 and WCED, 1987). Although some of these notions refer to detailed theories and programmes, others are no more than popular *buzzwords*. Nonetheless, they all stand for (explicit or implicit) interpretative schemes by which meaning is given to environmental problems, and on the basis of which environmental policy programmes are designed.

The changes in the predominant environmental discourses of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s are remarkable (cf. Dryzek, 1997). The anti-modernisation wave of the 1970s was to a large extent responsible for the rise of environmental issues. The dominant discourses (‘political ecology’, ‘eco-development’, ‘small is beautiful’, and others) were anti-statist and anti-capitalist in nature, causing considerable gaps

between mainstream politics and the countervailing power of, among others, the emerging environmental movement. The latter, incidentally, defined itself as a *counter*-movement, and phrased environmental issues primarily in terms of conflict. The late 1980s and 1990s in contrast are characterised by all-embracing consensus discourses ('ecological modernisation', 'sustainable development'), aiming at and to a large extent succeeding in getting support from right, left and green alike. In these contemporary discourses environmental problems are seen as manageable issues, to be managed not only by the state, but also by a wide range of co-operative stakeholders. In addition, problems are conceived as challenges to innovation – technological rather than political – and as opportunities to reconcile economy and ecology – therefore urging state, market and civil society agents to contribute their share. From this it becomes clear that these (successful) environmental policy discourses combine elements of the political modernisation thesis, at least those that are specific to environmental problems and policies, and include an appeal for new coalitions and new rules of the game. The above shows that environmental policy discourses, albeit implicitly, contain more general statements and positions on politics and policies, on the role of the state, and the like.

3. The dynamics of Policy Arrangements

Although the key-concept of the policy arrangement definition is *stabilisation*, one of our main hypotheses is that policy arrangements change in the course of history. This change of policy arrangements can be analysed from two perspectives: institutional and strategic (Giddens, 1984). The *institutional* analysis 'brackets' the role of agency and focuses on how institutional structures shape the conduct of agents, without however forgetting that this is only one side of the story. The *strategic* analysis, in turn, 'brackets' structures and focuses on the interventions of agents to explain social change. Below we apply this methodology of 'bracketing' in order to understand the change of policy arrangements. Firstly, the process of *political modernisation* provides an institutional focus on policy renewal as a result of changing relations between state, civil society and market on the one hand and new views on governance on the other (section 3.1). Secondly, day-to-day interactions between actors, which lead to *policy innovations*, provide a strategic analysis (section 3.2). The latter focuses on the (change of) arguments actors use, the norms and interests they stand for, the rules they use as well as the problem definitions they perceive.

3.1 Political Modernization

Political modernisation refers to processes of transformation within the political domain of society. In general, the demarcation of the political domain of society depends on the degree of insulation of the subsystems state, market and civil society.

In a situation where a sharp distinction between state, civil society and market exists, the position of the political domain will be mainly defined in terms of the rationalities of the state. However, contemporary societies show increasing encroachment, interweaving and interference of the three subsystems and demarcation lines are rather vague. Therefore we use a broad concept of the 'political domain' (cf. Held, 1989). Essentially, the political domain of society is the setting in which different groups (from state, civil society and market) produce and distribute resources (power and domination) and meaning (discourses) to shape public life.

To grasp the dynamics of the process of political modernisation we distinguish analytically between three phases: 'early', 'anti-' and 'late' (cf. Alexander, 1995). Each of the three phases can be characterised by specific, ideal-typical relations between state, civil society and market, and by dominant discourses on governance.

The '**early political modernisation**' phase is closely linked to the project of modernity itself. Central elements of the early (political) modernisation discourse are progress and the control over both society and nature, which come together in the notion of the 'manageable society'. The 'manageable society' refers to the idea of man's ability to shape both the social and the physical world. Although the modernisation project was driven by a number of different ideologies, they shared the basic assumption that it is possible and recommendable to outline the most desirable development of society. In the political domain this discourse of the constructed society is translated and reflected in models of rational policy making and synoptic planning, pluralistic concepts of democracy and functional concepts of steering and governability. Rational choice theories are predominant and rational policy makers play a central role within the political domain. The predominant concept in the 'early political modernisation' stage was that of a relative insulation of state, market and civil society, with each sphere functioning according to its own rationales: bureaucracy, competition and solidarity respectively. Although the state was regarded as the allocative and authoritative 'power container', thus determining the nature of policy arrangements, the relative insulation of the subsystems state, market and civil society, with their own distinctive rationales, does not imply a fixed position of each one in relation to the others. On the contrary, specific interrelations between state, market and civil society depend upon the predominant political preferences of a society at a given time, and upon its political and ideological traditions and their institutional structuring, which give rise to different policy arrangements.

The 1970s show both a renewal of theories of modernisation and the emergence of radical alternatives, the latter being theories and ideas of **anti-modernisation**. Alexander (1995) sees anti-modernisation as a reaction to the unsolved 'reality problems' of the modernisation project, such as inequity and inequality, poverty, dictatorship and postcolonialism. In the 1970s theories of anti-modernisation were proposed as providing more valid explanations of these problems. They focused on issues such as inequality and emancipation, democracy and participation. Central elements of the anti-modernisation discourse, such as

politicisation, emancipation and the liberation of labour from capitalist alienation etc. were being defined in terms of conflict, revolution and collective emancipation, combining the ideas of subversion of the state and politicisation of civil society (cf. Offe, 1986). The aim was to establish totally new linkages between the state and civil society, corresponding to classical ideas of 'the political community'. Therefore, while the state was under attack and anti-modernisation theorists emphasised the legitimisation crisis of the state, a variety of alternatives were supposed in neo-Marxist, eco-socialist, counter-productivity, dependence and de-industrialisation theories. Environmental issues were at the centre of many of these theories and thoughts, as they seemed to be the example *par excellence* of the one-dimensional early modernisation, resulting in neglecting side effects of the rationalistic reductionism of early modernity. Anti-modernist criticism focused on the one-sided, one-dimensional and reductionist role of the state and the market, perceived as a *de facto* coalition of power, which reinforced the social order in favour of particular capitalist interests, both at national and international level. Therefore, forms of radical democratisation and self-government, either on the local, the national or on the global level, were supposed.

Although none of these proposals for a different social and political order has been implemented in the Western world, these visions influenced politics and policy making on the ground. They, firstly, provoked a change in the content of politics, resulting in the emergence of well-considered policies on postmaterial issues, such as the environment and community work. Secondly, within these newly developing policy domains new policy arrangements were created, characterised by participation, self-regulation and self-determination. And thirdly, similar experiments and changes took place within some traditional policy domains as well, through the acknowledgement of new political actors, the recognition of new problem definitions and policy discourses, and so on, leading to the (partial) renewal of traditional policy arrangements.

Contemporary society is in transition as a consequence of processes of globalisation and individualisation. These processes are said to provoke a new stage in political modernisation in which the general idea of the 'manageable society' is being redefined. This phase of **late political modernisation** is a combination of debates on post and reflexive modernity. According to some post-modernist theorists contemporary societies show a new or intensified degree of fragmentation, pluralism and individualism, while political, economic and cultural life is strongly influenced by developments at the global level. Post-modernism proclaims multicultural and multiethnic societies and promotes the 'politics of difference' - linking the local and the global - in which identity is not unitary or essential, but fluid and shifting, fed by multiple sources and taking multiple forms (Kumar, 1995). Reflexive modernisation theorists understand contemporary changes as an accumulation of and within modernity (e.g. Giddens, Beck, and Castells). In reflexive modernisation the globalisation of risks is put at the forefront (e.g. climate change). It seems as though

there is no way to overcome these global risks, but at the same time individuals have to live with these unforeseen consequences of modernity. Beck depicts contemporary society as a *risk society*, which he assumes to be a stage of 'high' or 'radicalised' modernity. Essential here is the unintentional and unseen transition from modern industrial society to risk society. The risk society is understood to be a phase of development of modern society in which the amalgam of individual, social, economic and ecological risks, created by the momentum of innovation, increasingly eludes the control and protective institutions of industrial society. Like the individual, society as a whole also can no longer rely upon traditional institutions, and 'the less we can rely on traditional securities, the more risks we have to negotiate'.

In Beck's view, the controllability of the whole is problematic, as the risk society becomes a laboratory in which nobody is responsible for the outcomes of experiments (Beck, 1998: 10). According to him, the essence of contemporary politics is (reflexive) sub-politicisation of society. Sub-politics 'means shaping society *from below*. Viewed from above, this results in the loss of implementation power, the shrinkage and minimization of politics. In his interpretation of sub-politics Beck makes a distinction between 'rule-directed' and 'rule-altering politics'. Rule-directed politics functions within the rule system of the nation state, in itself a result of what Beck calls the 'first' modernity. Rule-altering politics on the other hand concerns changing the rules of the game. In reflexive political modernisation rule-directed and rule-altering politics mingle, overlapping and interfering with each other. While it may be true that in the phase of late political modernity the nation state model has lost its exclusiveness, and that the traditional divides between the state, the market and civil society have been crossed, this does not imply an unambiguous development. Essential to the phase of late political modernity is its plurality. The formation of new coalitions, the allocation of resources, the way actors construct identity, is perceived both within and outside the nation state model, and influenced by local-global interconnectedness. These processes will be reflected in the formation and construction of policy arrangements.

3.2 Policy Innovation

To repeat, the change of policy arrangements can be viewed from two perspectives: institutional and strategic. In the above, political modernisation was introduced as a concept to analyse the change of arrangements at the institutional level. Here we proceed by analysing the strategic level. To do so, we introduce the concept of *policy innovation*. Policy innovation refers to the renewal of policy making in day-to-day interactions in arrangements. The basic driving force of policy innovation is the decision of policy actors 'to do things otherwise'. They may do things otherwise, because - for example - the conditions of policy making may have changed, policy-makers may have experienced the ineffectiveness or unintended consequences of policy making, agents may develop new policy intentions, or 'shock events' may alter

the daily perceptions of agents. However, the danger of the concept of policy innovation is the 'voluntarist pitfall', namely that we may start to believe that actions are entirely intention-driven, and that any agent who develops new intentions can change policy practices. That's not the case. Human action is highly routinized and patterned, due to the fact that it is embedded in institutional structures (Giddens, 1984). Therefore we should not be too optimistic on the potential for policy innovation from below. Yet we know that agents have the capability to intervene and change policy practices.

An example of policy innovation in the environmental field is the reformulation of nuclear energy policy after the Tjernobyl disaster in most Western Europe. This shock event unmasked the unintended consequences of nuclear energy at European level, and most countries - confronted with nuclear fall-out - decided to phase out their nuclear programmes, and put more emphasis on sustainable energy based on wind, water and sun power (although still moderately). In other words, policy-makers decided to do things otherwise on the basis of a shock event. Another example is the introduction of bottom-up approaches in environmental policy making in the Netherlands (and other countries). Due to the fact that the old, top-down style of policy making turned out quite ineffective in the 1980s, as stakeholders did not feel committed, policy-makers started experiments with interactive policy making in the 1990s. Stakeholders were frequently consulted, and even allowed to actively participate in policy formulation and decision making themselves. At the same time, we know that (environmental) policy making is highly routinised. So-called SOPs (standard operation procedures) are operative in bureaucratic policy making, and remain to be operative, while old-fashioned policy styles survive. Policy-makers may even fall back on old routines, as Dutch agricultural policy making shows. Whereas this sector embraced network steering a few years ago, it partly fell back on top-down policy styles after the pig pest of 1998.

From the perspective of policy arrangements, innovations can take place at the level of its four dimensions. Policy agents may decide: (1) to allow more or new actors to participate in policy making or in coalition formation; (2) to reshape power relations, for example by adding to or withdrawing resources from a policy arrangement; (3) to reformulate the rules of the game on the basis of which policies are made; and (4) to reformulate the policy discourse concerned, for example by redefining its core concepts. However, innovations in one dimension may have consequences for other dimensions, and even for the arrangement as a whole. In Van Tatenhove et al. (2000) we typified this by introducing the metaphor of the *lemniscate*. A lemniscate¹ is a curve, shaped like a figure 8, or a knot or the bow of a ribbon. Following the loops of the lemniscate, innovation is the result of changes in one of the four dimensions of policy arrangements. Sometimes changes have been initiated by new coalitions, in other cases provoked by innovative discourses, or

¹ This curve is firstly described by the mathematician Jacob Bernoulli in 1694 and appeared to be a special case of a Cassinian Oval described by Cassini in 1680.

reinforced by rules and resources, setting off a chain reaction of changes in all aspects. Finally, this chain may lead to the change of *entire* policy arrangements.

3.3 *The renewal of policy arrangements*

Both political modernisation (as institutional change) as well as policy innovation (as strategic change) may lead to the renewal of policy arrangements. However, results of empirical research in different sub domains of environmental policy making, such as climate change, infrastructure, nature conservation and agriculture, shows that there is no clear, evolutionary path of arrangement development (Van Tatenhove et al., 2000). At least in environmental policy making, there is no predominant movement away from traditional, (inter)statist arrangements, in which the state plays the dominant role, towards innovative policy arrangements, in which the influence of market and civil society stakeholders has increased.

In *statist* arrangements the traditional political institutions are the ultimate locus of authoritative power and they therefore largely determine the contents and the organisation of policies. In *corporatist* arrangements political authority is shared by the state and some acknowledged intermediate organisations of ‘stakeholders’ in certain policy domains, especially trade unions and employers’ organisations (e.g. social security and welfare policies). *Liberal* arrangements are characterised by the domination of market agents. Policy arrangements at international level are of a rather different nature to domestic ones, and the above notions - statist, corporatist, liberal - are therefore less applicable. Besides, different arrangements can be distinguished at the European and the global levels as well. Traditionally, the *intergovernmental* arrangement is predominant: in these arrangements state agents - heads of state, prime ministers, diplomats, government representatives - determine political outcomes. This dominance of nation states is ‘the premise’ of international law (Hocking and Smith, 1990; Ray, 1987). However, private organisations have played (minor) roles in international policy making for a long time, and did so even in the days of the League of Nations (Woods, 1993). Since the Second World War, though, the position of non-state actors - NGOs, business lobbies, ‘epistemic communities’ etc. - has certainly been strengthened, both in the EU and the UN. Simultaneously the power of these international organisations has also increased. Authors therefore refer to both a diachronic and a synchronic development from intergovernmental to *transnational* arrangements in the international arena in which state, market and civil agents co-determine political outcomes (Hogenboom, 1998; Keohane and Nye, 1971; Keohane and Nye, 1989; Reinalda, 1997; Risse-Kappen, 1995).

However, there is not a unilinear development from modernist statist, corporatist and liberal arrangements to reflexive arrangements, referred to as civic, plural, transnational and interactive. Instead we observe a plurality of policy arrangements existing within a policy domain and between policy domains. In some areas we see the state withdrawing (energy and waste) while increasing its influence

in others (infrastructure, agriculture). We see new arrangements between state and civil society being established, while elsewhere the state adheres strictly to its privileges. We see patterns of traditionally privileged interaction between state and market being broken down, while such patterns are re-established in other domains.

4. Power: a multi-layered concept

One dimension of a policy arrangement is 'power'. After all, policy making presupposes power, in the sense that in policy domains agents have the capacity to strategically intervene, while (political) structures constrain or enable agents' interventions. Likewise, the *change* of arrangements is related to power. Policy change presupposes strategic intervention, based on agent power, as well as a process of re-institutionalisation, based on structural power. In order to analyse this linkage between change and power, we develop a three-layered model below. *Relational* power refers to 'policy innovation', *dispositional* power to 'policy arrangements' and *structural* power to 'political modernisation' (see table 1). This typification is inspired by a specific elaboration of Clegg's (1989) three circuits of power, Giddens' (1984) duality of structure in terms of power and domination, and Goverde & Van Tatenhove's (2000) three-layer model on power and policy networks.

Type of power	Focus	Policy concept
Relational	Achievement of policy outcomes by agents in interaction	Policy innovation
Dispositional	Positioning of agents in arrangements mediated by rules and resources	Policy arrangement
Structural	Structuring of arrangements mediated by orders of signification, domination and legitimisation	Political modernisation

Table 1: Three layers of power

The first layer refers to *relational power*, and hence to agents who are capable of achieving outcomes in interactions. This is also referred to as 'power as capacity' or as 'agent power' in literature, but it does not make sense to speak of power as if it were an amulet of one single actor (Elias, 1971; Goehler, 2000). Power is always constituted and exerted *in* social relationships. Goehler (2000) distinguishes between two basic forms of relational power: *transitive* and *intransitive*. The former refers to power struggles, to actors achieving outcomes *against* the will of others in a zero-sum game, the latter encompasses the ensemble of relationships constituting a group of people as a community; it exists in the *joint practices* of actors. This distinction is an important one

in the context of this paper, as both forms of relational power are to be linked to policy making. In policy making, actors struggle for certain individual outcomes, and a victory for one may be a loss to another (transitive power). At the same time, policy making aims at achieving common ends for the benefit of a policy community (intransitive power).

The second layer refers to dispositional power. According to Clegg dispositional power shapes the 'agency's capacity to act' (Clegg, 1989: 84). Through this type of power, agents are positioned in organisations vis-à-vis each other, and these positions co-determine what agents may achieve in terms of relational power. Rules and resources mediate this process of positioning. Organisational rules define and legitimise what position agents in an organisation may occupy, the division of allocative and authoritative resources determine the relative autonomy and dependency of an agent in a certain position. It should be noted here that positions, shaped by rules and resources, should not be objectified or reified, as organisations are always produced by agents through relational power. However, the constitution of an organisation transcends the capacity of agency, and therefore organisations seem to have a life of their own. And they *have*, e.g. in terms of constraints organisations pose on human action in the real life world. At the same time, we should not disentangle organisational structures from human action, as the latter constitute the former. This view also has the advantage of offering possibilities to theorise about intentional, organisational change.

The third layer, finally, refers to *structural* power, to the capacity of macro-societal structures to shape the nature and conduct of agents, being both individuals and collectivities (organisations!). Structural power refers to orders of signification, legitimisation and domination (Giddens, 1984) that are 'materialised' in discourses as well as in political, legal and economic institutions of societies. Mediated by these discourses and institutions, (collective) agents give meaning to the social world, consider some acts and thoughts legitimate, and others not, and mobilise resources to achieve certain outcomes. This mobilisation of resources is based on 'structured asymmetries of resources', which is given in any order of domination. This means that agents have uneven access to the constitution and use of resources. Here again, the 'capacity of structures' should not be subjectivised: structures, orders and institutions cannot *act*. They affect human conduct through human conduct, although - more than in the case of organisations - structures generally have a *long duree* which transcend the lifespan of an individual agent, and from that perspective these *exist*. Yet structures are linked to human action in structuration theory, albeit indirectly and in a distantiated time-space context.

5. Power and Change in Policy Making

Policy making is a dynamic process, which takes place in the context of dynamic processes of political modernisation and day-to-day policy innovations. In interactions

between a variety of agents problems are being defined, solutions are being suggested and measurements are implemented. In other words, policy activities, policy change and power have to be studied and analysed on different levels which are interdependent of each other: the level of policy innovation; the level of policy arrangements and the level of political modernisation. In doing so, the link between structure and agency will be grasped in an interconnected way.

First, at the level of *policy innovation* agents (may) have the capacity to enforce its will on others and/or the capacity to act in concert to achieve common ends. On this level relational power is the most dominant kind of power. It concerns the capacity of agents to 'name' and 'frame' environmental problems as political and policy problems, to mobilise resources to realise the most desirable solutions and to realise the most suitable organisational design for politics. In doing so, policy agents may decide to 'do things otherwise', and renew policy making, either by overruling 'conservative forces' that defend the *status quo* (transitive power), or by collectively changing rules of the game and/or policy discourses (intransitive power).

Second, at the level of *policy arrangements*, power is a dispositional phenomenon. Policy agents are positioned vis-à-vis each other in arrangements on the basis of the rules of the game as well as on the basis of an asymmetrical division of allocative and authoritative resources. This positioning co-determines what agents may achieve in terms of relational power and policy innovation.

Third, at the level of *political modernisation* structural power is predominant. Structural power refers to discourses of governance (signification), to the 'right way' of doing politics (legimitisation), and to structured asymmetries of resources (domination). These orders, substantiated in the institutions of the state, market and civil society, shape the nature of policy arrangements. However, political modernisation refers to the - at first sight - autonomous change of these orders and institutions, with consequences for the nature of policy arrangements and policy making. However, structural change is never 'autonomous', but linked to human conduct, as structures need to be continuously reproduced by agents in order to exist.

The distinction between the three levels of power is analytically. Central to the policy arrangement approach is that both policy change and power have to be studied on the level of policy arrangements. This enables us to understand the institutionalisation of environmental policy making as the interplay between interactions and structural developments. How does the interplay between innovation and structural developments come together on the level of policy arrangements? To repeat, we typified change in policy arrangements by introducing the metaphor of the *lemniscate*. The advantage of this metaphor to analyse change is that the lemniscate has no beginning and no ending. In other words policy making and policy innovation is the result of changes in one of the four dimensions of policy arrangements. The relations between and transformations in these dimensions are structured by the process of political modernisation and the specific institutionalisation of sub domains, resulting in different types of policy arrangements. In other words, changing relations

between state, civil society and market (structural focus) and the arguments of actors, the norms and values they stand for (strategic focus) induce change within policy arrangements.

When we look at change from a power perspective at the level of policy innovation power is relational and episodic. This 'power over', however, necessarily trades off some extent of 'fixing' of structural and dispositional power (compare Clegg, 1989: 215). Because policy making always takes place in the context of policy arrangements, relational and dispositional are inextricably linked, while the way arrangements are shaped by a specific division of allocative and authoritative resources is determined by structural power. And structures of domination, in turn, may change as a result of the changing interrelations between state, market and civil society. In the early and anti-modernisation stages, the state is the predominant 'power container'. Yet one can distinguish different types of policy arrangements within the nation state model, implying different structures of domination. Corporatist arrangements, for example, can be characterised by a typical institutional form of exchange relations between the state and (a small number of) interest groups, to which a formal, representative status is granted in policy formulation, decision making and implementation. While the state provides information, entrance, influence, status and a quasi-monopoly, the interest groups provide expertise, co-operation, discipline and legitimisation (Frouws, 1993: 43). This allocation of power to a large extent determines the capabilities of these actors (and of those not involved), and thereby the political outcome of this kind of arrangement. In statist and liberal arrangements the allocation of authoritative resources and, therefore, the division of political power is different, leading to other kinds of resource dependencies (Lieverink, 1995). In liberal arrangements, for instance, state authorities are dependent on those who control resources they do not have themselves. For example, the need for economic expertise and investment capital makes state agencies dependent on companies, private consultants, banks etc., while in some cases NGOs such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace provide the necessary political legitimacy (Willems, 1982). It goes without saying that in such cases of mutual resource dependency political power is less concentrated and more diffuse.

6. Conclusions

In this paper we discussed the relationship between power and policy. Policy making is a dynamic process, in which the organisation and the substance of policy constantly change. To understand these processes of change we introduced the concepts of policy arrangement, political modernisation and policy innovation. With these concepts we try to combine an analysis at the level of structural social change and an analysis at the level of strategic conduct. The first level focuses on the formation and institutionalisation of policy arrangements as a result of changing relations between

state, civil society and market, the second level emphasises the arguments actors use in interaction, the norms and values actors stand for and their definitions of problems and possible solutions. With the 'political modernisation' thesis, the 'policy arrangement' concept and the 'policy innovation' thesis we intended to provide a combination of strategic, institutional and structural approaches to policy making, by accentuating the institutionalisation of arrangements as being the interplay between discursive activity and processes of social and political change. At the same time policy making is a multi-level power game. Therefore, power has to be studied and analysed at three interconnected levels as well: the level of policy innovation (relational power); the level of policy arrangements (dispositional power) and the level of political modernisation (structural power). In the policy arrangement approach power is not restricted to the mobilisation of resources or the achievement of outcomes by actors alone, but it also focuses on dispositional and structural power. Taking the duality of structure seriously, the distribution of resources and the positioning of agents are structured by structural power, producing specific dependencies, which enable or constrain agents in day-to-day policy making.

References

- Alexander, J.C. (1995), *Fin de Siecle Social Theory. Relativism, Reduction, and the Problem of Reason*, London, New York: Verso.
- Arts, B. (1990), Brundtland en het concept van interdependentie, B. Arts, eds., *Ontwikkeling, Milieu en Veiligheid: Mondiale Interdependentie*, Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Jan Mets, pp. 5-35.
- Arts, Bas and Jan van Tatenhove (2000), Environmental Policy Arrangements: A New Concept, Goverde, Henri, eds., *Global and European Polity? Organizations, policies, contexts*, Aldershot, Ashgate, pp. 223-237
- Bachrach, P. and M. Baratz (1962), Two Faces of Power, *American Political Science Review*, 56, pp. 947-952.
- Beck, U. (1994), The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization, U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash eds., *Reflexive Modernization. Politics, tradition and aesthetics in the modern social order*, Oxford: Polity Press, pp. 1-55.
- Beck, U. (1996), World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society? Ecological Questions in a Framework of Manufactured Uncertainties, *Theory, Culture & Society*, 13(4), pp. 1-32.
- Beck, U. (1998), Politics of Risk Society, J. Franklin, eds., *The Politics of Risk Society*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 9-22.
- Benton, T. (1997), Beyond Left and Right? Ecological Politics, Capitalism and Modernity, M. Jacobs, eds., *Greening the Millennium? The new politics of the environment*, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 34-46.

- Castells, M. (1996), *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume I, The Rise of the Network Society*, Oxford UK, Malden USA: Blackwell.
- Castells, M. (1997), *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume II, Power of Identity*, Oxford UK, Malden USA: Blackwell.
- Castells, M. (1998), *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume III End of Millennium*, Oxford UK, Malden USA: Blackwell.
- Clegg, Stewart, R. (1989), *Frameworks of Power*, London, SAGE
- Cohen, I.J. (1989), *Structuration Theory. Anthony Giddens and the Constitution of Social Life*, London: MacMillan Education Ltd.
- Dryzek, J.S. (1997), *The Politics of the Earth. Environmental Discourses*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Elias, N. (1971), *Wat is Sociologie?*, Utrecht/Antwerpen, Het Spectrum
- Frouws, J. (1993), *Mest en macht. Een politiek-sociologische studie naar belangenbehartiging en beleidsvorming inzake de mestproblematiek in Nederland vanaf 1970*, Wageningen.
- Giddens, A. (1981), *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. Vol. I Power, property and the state*, London, Basingstoke: The MacMillan Press Ltd.
- Giddens, A. (1984), *The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Giddens, A. (1990), *The Consequences of Modernity*, Oxford: Polity Press.
- Goehler, Gerhard (2000), Types of Power Relations. To be published in: Goverde, H., P. Cerny, M. Haugaard and H. Lentner eds., *Power in Contemporary Politics*, London, SAGE.
- Goverde, H., P. Cerny, M. Haugaard and H. Lentner eds., *Power in Contemporary Politics*, London, SAGE,
- Goverde, Henri and Jan van Tatenhove (2000), Power and Policy Networks, Goverde, H., P. Cerny, M. Haugaard and H. Lentner eds., *Power in Contemporary Politics*, London, SAGE, pp. 96-111
- Guzzini, S. (1993), Structural power: the limits of neorealist power analysis, *International Organization*, 47(3), pp. 443-478.
- Hajer, M.A. (1997), *The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Held, D. (1989), *Political Theory and the Modern State. Essays on State, Power and Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Held, D. (1995), *Democracy and the Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hocking, B. and M. Smith (1990), *World Politics. An introduction to international relations*, New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf.
- Hoogenboom, B. (1998), *Mexico and the NAFTA Environment Debate. The Transnational Politics of Economic Integration*, Utrecht: Van Arkel/International Books.

- Huber, J. (1985), Ecologische modernisering, E. Van den Abbeele, eds., *Ontmanteling van de groei. Leesboek over een andere economie*, Nijmegen: Markant, pp. 161-168.
- Keohane, R.O. and J.S. Nye, eds. (1971), *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Keohane, R.O. and J.S. Nye, eds. (1989), *Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition*, Glenview: Scott, Foresman & Company.
- Kickert, W.J.M., E.H. Klijn and J.F.M. Koppenjan eds. (1997), *Managing Complex Networks. Strategies for the Public Sector*, London: SAGE.
- Kolk, J.E.M. (1996), *Forests in international environmental politics: international organisations, NGOs and the Brazilian Amazon*, Utrecht: International Books.
- Krasner, S.D. (1985), *Structural conflict: The Third World against global liberalism*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kumar, K. (1995), *From Post-industrial to post-modern society. New Theories of the Contemporary World*, Oxford UK, Cambridge USA: Blackwell.
- Liefferink, J.D. (1995), *Environmental policy on the way to Brussels. The issue of acidification between the Netherlands and the European Community*, Wageningen: WAU.
- Lukes, S. (1974), *Power. A Radical View*, London: Macmillan.
- Mol, A.P.J. (1995), *The Refinement of Production. Ecological modernization theory and the chemical industry*, Utrecht: Van Arkel.
- Offe, C. (1986), Nieuwe sociale bewegingen als meta-politieke uitdaging, I. Weijers, eds., *Tegenspraken, dilemma's en impasses van de verzorgingsstaat, deel 2*, Amsterdam: SOMSO.
- Princen, T. and M. Finger (1994), *Environmental NGOs in world politics. Linking the local to the global*, London: Routledge.
- Ray, L.R. (1987), *Global Politics*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Reinalda, B. (1997), *Private in Form and Public in Purpose: (I)NGO's as Political Actors in World Politics*, ECPR 25th joint sessions of workshops, Bern, Switzerland.
- Risse-Kappen, T., eds. (1995), *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sachs, I. (1977), Het menselijke leefmilieu, J. Tinbergen, eds., *Naar een Rechtvaardige Internationale Orde. Een rapport van de Club van Rome*, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp.309-321.
- Schumacher, E.F. (1974), *Small is Beautiful. A Study of Economics as if People Mattered*, London: Abacus.
- Strange, S. (1988), *States and Markets*, London: Pinter.
- Van Tatenhove, Jan (1999), Political Modernisation and the Institutionalisation of Environmental Policy, Wissenburg, Marcel, Gökhan Orkan, Ute Collier, eds., *European Discourses on Environmental Policy*, Aldershot, Ashgate, pp. 59-78

Van Tatenhove, Jan, Bas Arts and Pieter Leroy, eds. (2000), *Political Modernisation and the Environment. The Renewal of Environmental Policy Arrangements*, Dordrecht/Boston/London, Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Willems, P., eds. (1982), *Pressure Groups in the Global System*, London: Frances Pinter.

Woods, L. (1993), Nongovernmental Organizations and the United Nations System: Reflection upon the Earth Summit, *International Studies Notes*, 1993(1), pp. 9-15.

World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), *Our common future*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.